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JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGA-
TION OF SOUTHERN TRANSIT. By Catherine A. 
Barnes.1 New York: Columbia University Press. 1983. Pp. 
xi, 313. $25.00. 
J. Morgan Kousserz 
In 1867, when New Orleans blacks protested the segregation 
practices of private streetcar companies by boarding white-only 
horse cars, the military Reconstruction commander in that city or-
dered the cars integrated. In 1887, the newly established Inter-
state Commerce Commission harshly_ condemned the unequal 
facilities for blacks on southern railroads. In 1942, a black soldier 
who sat in a white-only section of a bus in Beaumont, Texas, was 
arrested, then beaten and shot by policemen. In 1955, when civil 
rights activist Rosa Parks refused to move from a white seat in a 
Montgomery, Alabama bus, she started a massive boycott that 
brought Martin Luther King, Jr. to international prominence. In 
1962, a sixty-one-year old white "freedom rider" suffered perma-
nent brain damage after being beaten by white counter-protesters 
on an interstate bus in Anniston, Alabama. Yet in 1964, when 
Congress finally repassed the 1875 Civil Rights Act rule against 
segregation in public transit, the end of this most symbolic facet of 
the Jim Crow system received little praise from the civil rights 
movement and little opposition from the white South. These inci-
dents and scores of others, legal and extralegal, are treated in this 
first comprehensive analysis of the history of segregated public 
transit in the South. Catherine Barnes's pithy, understated book is 
a solid combination of legal and social history. It should be read 
by anyone interested in the twisted path of race relations in 
America. 
The collective memory is neither long nor deep. Social com-
mentators, not to mention students, black as well as white, often 
believe that the struggle against segregation was philosophically 
and strategically uncomplicated and rather brief, and that com-
plexities and real difficulties arose only when the battles for racial 
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equality moved north and adopted such remedies as busing and 
affirmative action. Barnes shows the fallacy of at least the first 
half of this view. Even though the fourteenth amendment clearly 
barred government-enforced racial inequities, even though com-
mon law rules had arguably outlawed private discrimination in 
places of public accommodation well before 1868, even though 
segregated facilities were always manifestly unequal, the struggle 
against them lasted nearly a century after the Civil War. If one 
begins (as Barnes, largely confining herself to the South, does not) 
with the protests against Jim Crow railroads in Massachusetts in 
1842, the effort lasted for 122 years. Straightforward, comprehen-
sive laws and seemingly binding legal decisions were repeatedly 
sidestepped or evaded, although eventually they were effective. 
The same arguments, the same strategies, the same boycotts, suits, 
lobbying, petitions, marches, sit-ins, and ride-ins had to be em-
ployed over and over again to accomplish what now seem to us to 
be patently fair outcomes. The struggle to force Americans to put 
their egalitarian creed into practice has been nasty and brutish, 
but not short. 
Lending a good deal of support to C. Vann Woodward's "Jim 
Crow thesis" that rigid segregation did not arise immediately after 
the Civil War, but only after about 1890, Barnes finds that Recon-
struction era practices in the South "developed a mixed and in-
consistent pattern in public transportation.") Three southern 
states required transit segregation by law in 1865-66. In retalia-
tion, blacks boycotted and brought suits, several of which were 
successful. After their enfranchisement, they used their political 
power to force through public accommodations laws in seven 
southern states and, in 1875, a national civil rights statute. Even 
before the Supreme Court invalidated the national law in 1883, 
most of the Deep South segregated by custom, while the patterns 
in the Carolinas and the upper South were inconsistent. Only af-
ter 1887 were mandatory Jim Crow provisions passed in most 
southern states, and it was only subsequent to that date that segre-
gation became nearly absolute in the South. Even then, as August 
Meier and Elliott Rudwick noted years ago, black boycotts some-
times delayed the imposition of segregation regulations. On these 
matters, Barnes summarizes past scholarship succinctly. 
Black legal defeats in the pre-1954 fight against segregation 
are no doubt better known, but Barnes usefully catalogues the not 
uncommon partial victories as well. The first appointees to the 
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Interstate Commerce Commission sought to guarantee equal in-
terstate facilities, although they failed to bar segregated ones per 
se. The Supreme Court, in the 1914 McCabe4 decision, strongly 
seconded the ICC's tough rhetoric, but its decision had no tangi-
ble effect. From 1900 to 1920, however, the ICC backed down, 
accepting the railroads' patently fraudulent contentions that they 
were providing equal although separate accommodations for 
black passengers in the South. As earlier legal precedents were 
circumvented and southern segregation practices hardened, blacks 
ceased to challenge them. The replacement of sporadic local ef-
forts by a potential national campaign coordinated by the 
NAACP produced few results, because that organization before 
the 1950's devoted its limited resources to other, less symbolic dis-
criminatory practices. 
In 1937, Arthur Mitchell, the first black ever elected to Con-
gress as a Democrat, was Jim Crowed on a Rock Island train in 
Arkansas. The ICC rejected his $50,000 damage suit in a split 
decision that ignored commission precedents. Mitchell, joined by 
the Roosevelt administration, appealed to the Supreme Court and 
won a unanimous 1941 decision. Ruling that separate really had 
to be equal, Chief Justice Hughes fulfilled the promise of his 1914 
McCabe opinion. In a parallel to the later Brown-Bol!ingslinkage 
between the equal protection and due process clauses, Hughes 
read the nondiscrimination clause of the Interstate Commerce Act 
in the light of the constitutional guarantee in the fourteenth 
amendment. Although the Court did not rule that segregation in 
itself was illegal, Hughes's opinion did seem to require such strict 
equality as to force railroads to offer vastly upgraded services to 
any blacks able and willing to pay for them. General desegrega-
tion of first-class sleeping and parlor cars during World War II 
breached the wall of segregation, but did not lead immediately to 
nondiscrimination in the second-class facilities that were all most 
blacks could afford. 
Immediately after the war, the Roosevelt justices continued 
the Supreme Court's role as a molder of opinion with the Mor-
gan6 and Bob-Lo 7 decisions. Morgan overturned a Virginia law 
that segregated interstate as well as intrastate passengers, while 
Bob-Lo upheld the application of a Michigan integration provi-
sion to a black excursionist traveling from Detroit to a Canadian 
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island. Somewhat inconsistent on commerce clause grounds, 
these opinions (in cases brought, respectively, by a state NAACP 
and a private party) indicated both the willingness of a solid ma-
jority of the justices to overturn segregation and the disorganized 
nature of the legal campaign up to that point. The decisions' 
practical inconsequence, moreover, demonstrated again how frus-
trating the struggle against segregation could be. Morgan had 
merely banned statutory segregation of interstate travelers. To 
avoid the confusion of treating local and interstate customers dif-
ferently, and perhaps because company officials shared racist sen-
timents, interstate bus corporations merely replaced the invalid 
laws with their own private segregation policies. A tragic event in 
the year between the two decisions epitomized their merely partial 
effectiveness. When a young black refused to move to a Jim Crow 
coach, an Atlantic Coast Line conductor shot and killed him. 
Why such incidents attracted so little attention, Barnes never 
explains. 
By 1953, after litigation had brought many small local victo-
ries and a few narrow national ones, conditions in transit segrega-
tion had progressed back to those of the 1880's---checkered 
patterns in the border states, but nearly total separation in the 
Deep South. It was at this point that the national NAACP and 
even the Eisenhower administration moved forcefully to outlaw 
all segregation in interstate transportation in one climactic case. 
Filed with the ICC after the Supreme Court had decided Brown, 
the Keyss and NAA CP9 cases finally convinced the ICC's new 
commissioners to renege on their sweetheart arrangement with the 
railroads, construe relevant Supreme Court decisions broadly, and 
order an end to Jim Crow practices for all interstate travelers. 
Barnes argues convincingly that litigation and conventional 
political pressure were insufficient to win the struggle. Although 
she never dismisses lawsuits as curtly as radicals did in the 1960's, 
neither does she take their importance for granted, as many legal 
commentators continue to do. Boycotts and ride-ins, the latter pi-
oneered by the Congress of Racial Equality in a 1947 border state 
tour and famously renewed by CORE in the 1962 freedom rides, 
were essential because of the economic pressure they put on bus 
companies, the public exposure of harsh racist policies that they 
provided, and the consequent pressure that. th~y put on state and 
national leaders. But boycotts also had limitations-they were 
difficult to organize and keep going and they gave local officials, 
8. Keys v. Carolina Coach Co., 64 M.C.C. 769 (1955). 
9. NAACP v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 297 I. C. C. 335 ( 1955). 
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who faced a mostly segregationist white electorate, no incentive to 
compromise. Nor was litigation a complete answer: it was expen-
sive, hostile judges might delay or take advantage of technicalities 
to deny blacks relief, and companies that were not parties to such 
suits might simply disregard precedents until they were applied to 
each company explicitly. Although most intercity and local 
transit systems in the outer South and in some large cities of the 
Deep South had desegregated by 1960, much annoying segrega-
tion persisted. The lessons of the 1950's and 1960's were that it 
took a combination of senseless, televised violence and organized 
voting power to move the conscience of the nation's leaders, and 
that judicial and administrative decrees generally only finalized 
the decisions of more overtly political bodies or provided conve-
nient covers for the capitulation of companies and local politicians 
who already desired to avoid further conflicts. 
Barnes's trenchant analyses of the strategies and actions of 
local, state, and federal officials; of black individuals and civil 
rights organizations; and of shifts in white practices and public 
opinion in the South and the nation are based on a thorough im-
mersion in relevant sources. Far from confining herself to pub-
lished legal opinions and previous monographs, she combed the 
NAACP-LDF, CORE, ICC, Justice Department, and many other 
manuscript collections, perused many newspapers (not just the in-
dexed New York Times), effectively used the oral history collec-
tions on the civil rights movement, and conducted some interviews 
herself. Her mastery of such a broad range of research materials 
lends authority to the judgments of her conclusions: the increas-
ing scope of federal government activity, northern black political 
power, and the intellectual attack on racism after 1930 created a 
favorable climate for the elimination of Jim Crow in mid-century. 
Judicial action, especially by the Supreme Court, was painfully 
slow, but always in the right direction. Federal administrative 
agencies were much harder to move, but when finally prodded by 
judicial decisions and persistent appeals by black civil rights activ-
ists, their decrees, which were not confined to the cases immedi-
ately before them, affected larger numbers of people. Congress 
did nothing to eliminate Jim Crow transit until 1964, and state 
and local officials in the South were segregation's staunchest allies. 
The Eisenhower administration did somewhat more than it is usu-
ally given credit for, while the Kennedy record was very mixed. 
Transit segregation was easier to end than other types of discrimi-
nation, because contacts between blacks and whites in restaurants, 
buses, trains, and planes were brief and largely symbolic and be-
cause the power of the national government could more easily be 
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applied to this area. But the desegregation of transportation was 
broadly significant: it invigorated the civil rights movement and 
relieved blacks from having to face, again and again, demeaning 
reminders of their subordinate social status. 
Why is the author of this model study not in an academic 
post? 
